Naval War College Review
Volume 66
Number 3 Summer

Article 17

2013

History of Acquisition in the Department of
Defense, vol. 1, Rearming for theCold War,
1945–1960,
Richard Gentz

Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review
Recommended Citation
Gentz, Richard (2013) "History of Acquisition in the Department of Defense, vol. 1, Rearming for theCold War, 1945–1960,," Naval
War College Review: Vol. 66 : No. 3 , Article 17.
Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol66/iss3/17

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.

	b o o k r e v i e ws	

Gentz: History of Acquisition in the Department of Defense, vol. 1, Rear

Bainbridge, Oliver Hazard Perry, and
Matthew Perry; and later admirals of
the U.S. Navy, including Winfield Scott
Schley, Henry Mayo, Ernest J. King,
Harris Laning, and recent chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral
William J. Crowe, along with a host of
other naval officers and mariners of all
types. The entries for each person tend
to be very short, sometimes only a line
with the name of the Masonic lodge
with which that person was associated.
In other cases, such as King George VI
and President Franklin D. Roosevelt,
there are twenty- and thirty-line entries
on the individuals’ lives and Masonic
connections. Some entries have dates
of birth and death, others do not.
The alphabetical listing of individuals is
complemented by two short appendices.
The first is devoted to a listing of prominent naval officers in the twentieth century who opposed Freemasonry, such as
French admirals Darlan and Platon, the
Austrian Horthy, and the German admiral von Rosenberg. The second appendix
lists the Masonic lodges active in 2010
that were originally founded by people
with professional maritime connections,
including one in France, seventy-one
in the United Kingdom, twelve in the
United States, and one each in Australia, the Philippines, and Cuba. Those in
the United States include naval lodges
established in the Washington Navy Yard
in 1805 and at Mare Island, California,
in 1855, as well as the Mariner’s Lodge
of New York, established in 1825. The
alphabetical listing of individuals also
includes short histories of “Naval Lodge
no. 4, Washington, D.C.,” and “Naval
Lodge no. 2612, London.” The Masonic
maritime research lodge in France, under the direction of Jean-Marc van Hille,
continues its pioneering research for
this reference work, aiming for complete
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worldwide coverage. An updated digital
edition is reportedly in planning.
john b. hattendorf

Naval War College

Converse, Elliott V. History of Acquisition in
the Department of Defense. Vol. 1, Rearming for
the Cold War, 1945–1960. Washington, D.C.:
Historical Office of the Secretary of Defense,
2012. Available at history.defense.gov/resources/
OSDHO-Acquisition-Series-Vol1.pdf. 784pp.

It is immediately obvious that the effort
put into this work was monumental. The
foreword by Dr. J. Ronald Fox states that
“management of defense acquisition has
slowly improved, but not without painful
periods of recreating and re-experiencing
acquisition management problems of the
past. . . . It is my belief that the painful
periods have resulted to a significant
degree from the absence of a comprehensive history of defense acquisition or
even a formal record of lessons learned.”
The initial volume covers the twists and
turns of the politics of the post–World
War II transition from total war to a
situation where a single, powerful adversary possessed the very same weapon
that had ended the earlier conflict. The
newly conceived Defense Department
was required to oversee this problem.
Technology was accelerating across the
entire spectrum in the 1950s. The newly
constituted U.S. Air Force first fought in
the Korean War with the short-legged
Lockheed P-80 Shooting Star and ended
up with the North American F-86 and
the “century series” of operational
fighters from the F-100 to the F-106.
The Navy started out with the Grumman F8F Bearcat and ended up with
the F8U Crusader, which set a record in
1956 at one thousand miles per hour.
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The multiple external, real-world
steering currents must be placed in
historical context. There is no question
that during the early 1950s, following
the Soviets’ demonstration of nuclearweapons capability in August 1949, the
U.S. Navy had to fight for a place at the
table. This situation was exacerbated
when Louis A. Johnson, the second
defense secretary (28 March 1949 to 19
September 1950), canceled the construction of the carrier United States in what
was for a very short time a period of
untimely total-defense-budget reductions. It was to be British and U.S.
carriers that provided air support for the
ever-shrinking Korean “Pusan Pocket.”
The relevance of these comments ties to
the Defense Department’s acquisition
and the troubled development and operational life of the Navy’s North American AJ nuclear bomber. World War II
ace Jimmy Flatley called this period “the
bad old days.” It was a time when the naval aviation accident rate peaked for all
high-performance aircraft. The Crusader was among the worst. The problems
of the AJ were well known. The era,
with all that was happening in military
aviation, including aircraft like the
B-58, should be viewed in this context.
The B-58 discussion covers the twists
and turns of the contract, tracing an
amazing technical achievement that
pressed all sides of the engineering
envelope from the coke-bottle fuselage
to the requirement for navigation and
ordnance delivery at supersonic speeds.
This section of the book provides
insights into and lessons in government and contractor interactions,
many of which remain valid today.
The similarity will become evident
in the next volume when the Total
Package Procurement Concept will be
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covered in the Lockheed C-5 chapter
—an example of Dr. Fox’s continuing
reoccurrence of acquisition concepts.
The two major successes of acquisition in the 1950s were the Atlas and
Polaris ballistic-missile programs.
General Bernard A. Schriever managed
the Air Force program, and Admiral
“Red” Raborn led Polaris development.
“Years later, [the former CNO Admiral
Arleigh] Burke told interviewers that
the officer he wanted ‘didn’t have to be
a technical man. He had to be able to
know what technical men were talking
about. He had to get a lot of different
kinds of people to work [together].’”
The Soviets tested a hydrogen bomb in
1955 and launched Sputniks 1 and 2 in
October and November 1957, respectively. In September 1961 the Atlas D
was operational, and in mid-November
1960, shortly after Kennedy’s election,
USS George Washington (SSBN 598)
departed Charleston, South Carolina,
on an operational patrol with sixteen
nuclear-tipped Polaris missiles.
How did this happen?
What remains clear in the text are that
both Schriever and Raborn were given
carte blanche and direct access to their
service heads, as well as to whoever
could provide assistance in industry
and academia. A review of Air Force
and Navy aircraft development highlights that the two services were literally
stumbling through technology advances
in aero and engine developments and
systems. The 1950s produced aircraft
that continued (in several cases into the
1980s) to contribute—for example, the
A-6 and F-4. And of course, the B-52,
C-130, and KC-135 still do today.
admiral richard gentz, usn, ret.
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